In 1993 North Korea had one functioning nuclear reactor, and was in the process of building other much larger facilities. They were based on the Magnox design, and were well suited to the production of weapons grade plutonium as a by-product. In fact the Magnox station “Calder Hall” had been used for decades for just this purpose in the U.K. By this time there had been 8000 spent fuel rods produced by the functioning reactor with enough plutonium for 6 to 8 bombs.
The Clinton administration, using Jimmy Carter as a negotiator, brokered the 1994 Agreed Framework, which specified:
- Normalisation of economic and political relations. This movement towards peace included statements by both sides that they harboured no hostile intent toward the other.
- Halting operation of the functioning reactor and construction of other reactors of Magnox design.
- IAEA inspection of nuclear facilities and spent fuel storage to bring the country into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Spent fuel to be “canned” and removed from the country.
- U.S to secure diplomatic and legal rights, and facilitate financing of two 1000 megawatt light-water nuclear power reactors. It’s considered far more difficult to generate weapons grade material from the by-product of this reactor design than the Magnox design. Japan and South Korea paid for and supplied the reactors, and construction was begun in August 2001.
- The U.S provides fuel oil sufficient to compensate for the electricity generating capacity given up by North Korea.
Many Congressional Republicans were outraged at what they term “appeasement”. In part because of Congressional opposition the construction of the light water reactors was delayed and delivery of the fuel oil was often late. Meanwhile North Korea suffered terrible famines due to flooding and economic decline in the mid 90s, causing up to 2 million deaths from starvation. South Korea began the “sunshine policy” of engagement and cooperation with the north.
North Korea surprised and dismayed its neighbours with the test firing of a three stage Taepodong missile, demonstrating that it had the capacity to attack Japan directly. Negotiations and easing of some of the US sanctions in place since the Korean War led to a pledge to freeze tests of long-range missiles. Reunions of divided families took place at the border, and athletes from both nations marched together at the Sydney Olympics in 2000.
Donald Rumsfeld was on the board of a company (ABB) which manufactured the two light water nuclear reactors which formed part of the Agreed Framework. Nevertheless in January 2002 President Bush reverses Clinton’s policy of engagement with North Korea, naming them as part of the “Axis of Evil”. The new administration felt that it had evidence of a Secret North Korean weapons program, and in October James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State, announced that the regime had admitted this when confronted with evidence obtained by the US. As a result the oil shipments were suspended and the Agreed Framework fell apart.
In fact North Korea denies any such admission, and it seems at least possible that the “evidence” pointed only to low grade rather than weapons grade enrichment. In any case the Clinton approach was now dead in the water. In August of 2003 six party talks (the two Koreas, US, China, Japan, and Russia) open in Beijing but end in confusion when the US claims North Korea has declared an intention to develop nuclear weapons. Tensions continue to escalate and two further rounds of six party talks break down. In September 2004 North Korea announces to the UN General Assembly that it has processed the 8000 spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons.
North Korea seems to be adopting increasingly desperate tactics. It withdraws from the 6 party talks, shuts down the Yongbyon reactor to reprocess the fuel rods for weapons, offers to abandon its nuclear programme in exchange for a non-aggression pact with the US and a light water reactor, is implicated in a currency counterfeiting scandal, continues to test fire missiles, and asks for bilateral talks with the US. Then, with only a few days notice, announces that it has carried out an underground nuclear test.
How much of this is a result of the aggressive and threatening behaviour of the US under Bush? For that matter is engagement to blame? Kim Dae-Jung, the South Korean architect of that country’s “Sunshine Policy”, blames Bush, but his political rival and successor Roh Moo-Hyun lays the blame at the feet of Kim Dae Jung and Clinton. Or is it all the inevitable consequence of the catastrophic breakdown of a failed state led by a madman?
Certainly North Korea itself says US belligerence left it no option, and yet it is inconceivable that the US would attack a country so closely under Chinese protection. It seems far more likely that the test, whether or not successful, was a bargaining chip rather than a matter of national security; an attempt to earn more, at least in terms of pride, with spent fuel rods than had been achieved with engagement or counterfeit dollars. It seems a terribly misguided tactic. The “Sunshine Policy” is in tatters and the hawks vindicated.
But it’s the world as a whole, and not just North Korea, that is the loser here. There is the threat of a terrorist nuke and the prospect of nuclear blackmail by a failed state. The idea of rebuilding North Korea and helping its people has become a fantasy, and the pronouncements of North Korean officials are infused with paranoia and eschatalogic madness. It’s quite true that the bomb is at the moment too large to form a warhead for one of Kim Jong-il’s missiles, and it’s possible that the test was a failure. So far the results are more political than practical, but it’s bad news for us all that North Korea is burning bridges with it’s neighbours.