There has been a major but silent shift in US nuclear policy under the current administration. This was first apparent in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, and became clearer under the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.
To maximise deterrence of WMD use, it is essential US forces prepare to use nuclear weapons effectively and that US forces are determined to employ nuclear weapons if necessary to prevent or retaliate against WMD use.
Lowering threshold for nuclear weapon use
There are eight situations identified in which nuclear strike might occur. Many of these imply a preemtive strike, and some are not even associated with the presence of enemy weapons of mass destruction, but simply involve gaining a tactical advantage.
- An adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations.
- Imminent attack from an adversary’s biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy.
- Attacks on adversary installations including weapons of mass destruction; deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons; or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies.
- Demonstration of U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary WMD use.
- To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces, including
mobile and area targets. - For rapid and favourable war termination on US terms.
- To ensure success of US and multinational operations.
- To respond to adversary-supplied WMD use by surrogates against US
and multinational forces or civilian populations.
The above guidelines, already very broad, conceal a major disporportionality of response. Chemical or even biological WMDs are ineffectual weapons, difficult to deploy effectively, as likely to cause friendly as enemy casualties. The Aum sect in Japan experimented unsuccessfully with biological agents for years, before releasing a chemical agent in the most ideal conditions (the subway) and still only causing limited casualties. Iraq and Iran are well aware of the random and limited use of battlefield chemical agents, having tried them out on one another in the 80′s. A nuclear response, as evinced by the fire in nuclear material at Chernobyl, could render large portions of a country uninhabitable and cause, as at Hiroshima, tens or hundreds of thousands of casualties.
Integration of nuclear weapons into theatre operations
The Doctrine provides for
Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks [to] ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies.
The pattern is clear from the doctrine document as a whole. It provides a framework for bringing nuclear weapons, both low yield and strategic, into play as another tool in the arsenal of US theatre commanders. Nuclear strikes are now a way to ensure success of US operations and bring about a rapid and favourable war termination. Nuclear weapons are viewed not as a way of preventing war, but of winning it.
Preemption and preventative war
When he released the National Security Strategy on March 16th, Stephen Hadley, the President’s national security advisor, said:
one cannot let dangers grow to the point of imminent threat to the United States without taking action, and if other measures fail, obviously we retain the right to use force.
This commitment to preemptive strikes, as Seth Weinberger points out, involves not just preemption, which would be the case where there was a clear and immediate threat to the US, but preventative war – attacking in order to prevent an enemy becoming a threat in the future. In 2003 the US lied about evidence of WMDs in order to justify a preemptive strike, where in fact they were engaging in a preventative war. It seems possible that they will use the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons in five or ten years as justification for launching an attack now.
Under long-standing principles of self-defence, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of an enemy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialise. This is the principle and logic of pre-emption.
This is a claim that preventative war, which is illegal, is in fact preemptive war in the case of WMD’s. And the logic is particularly troubling because it could be used to justify almost any war. For example China might at some time in the future wish to attack the US with its nuclear weapons. An attack on China now could therefore be justified on the principle that this capability must be destroyed while they do not have good long range missiles and are unprepared for defence.
Anticipating legal and moral objections
The doctrine acknowledges that initiation of nuclear war may result in world condemnation, but claims that no customary or conventional international law prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In fact, as the Pentagon must be aware, the use of nuclear weapons has been explicitly stated by the International Court of Justice to be illegal except in the last resort where the alternative is the annihilation of the nation using them. Three further judges only dissented from this ruling because they felt that the use of nuclear weapons would be illegal even in this extremity.
In other places the doctrine mentions the Principle of Proportionality, drawing from this the conclusion that the planning for use of nuclear weapons must minimise collateral damage and create a clear military advantage. This obscures the ICJ ruling that because of the nature of the effects of nuclear weapons, they would in general fail the test of the Principle of Distinction (that attacks may not be directed at civilian targets) and the Principle of Proportionality (since their effects on the civilian population would outweigh any military effect). There was talk within SRATCOM of the illegality of countervale targeting – which involves destruction of the enemy’s military related industries, resources, and institutions – because of the harm caused to civilians. After considering changing the term to critical infrastructure targeting, both terms were dropped without changing the targeting.
Contingency plans for nuclear strike
CONPLAN 8022-02 is STRATCOM’s contingency plan for dealing with “imminent” threats from countries like Iran and North Korea. It deals with rapidly deployed small scale strikes rather than theatre scale operations like the invasion of Iraq. It employs bombing, electronic warfare, possibly backed up by commando raids, to destroy either an individual target such as a missile silo, or a whole WMD infrastructure. It explicitly includes the option of nuclear strikes to destroy bunkers and other difficult targets. Funds for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) were probably stopped in Congress, but the B61-11 “deep earth penetrator” exists in large numbers.
The need for a demonstration
This is the heart of the matter. The US feels that its conventional forces are over-stretched, but it cannot use the threat of nuclear attack unless that threat is believed. From the 2001 NPR document:
To maintain their deterrent effect, U.S. nuclear forces must maintain a strong and visible state of readiness – permitting a swift response to any no-notice nuclear attack against the United States, its forces, or allies.
This addresses the capability, but the nuclear planners are aware that the US must demonstrate the willingness to use nuclear weapons if the threat is to be credible.
What would be ideal, according to this style of thinking, is for a situation to arise where a country is developing or has nearly developed WMDs. Even better, that country should have links to terrorists so that the threat extends by implication to anywhere in the western world. A nuclear WMD threat has the advantage of proportionality compared to chemical or biological weapons. The country must also be or be able to be portrayed as a rogue state, outside inspection or legal means of defusing the situation. Then, in the thinking of the nuclear hawks, the world could be forced to accept that the US had no option but to use nuclear as well as conventional arms in an attack on that country.
The outcome would be, in this view, a huge increase in the ability of the US to project its power and influence around the world. Any country, at any time, must measure the possibility that US long range missiles, bombing, commandos and nuclear strike could together destroy infrastructure and render large areas impassable and uninhabitable. Venezuela, for example, could not talk of drafting half a million reservists over a couple of years as a credible defence against a US military over-stretched in Iraq. Belarus, Syria, and many other states would be subject, effectively, to Finlandization beyond anything we see today.
Iran
Unfortunately Iran fits these requirements far too well, especially after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s bellicose remarks. Iran has reasons of pride and sovereignty for wanting nuclear capability, especially with 150 000 US troops just across the border and a nuclear armed Israel. The US has perfectly good reasons for concern over the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran, but Iran is not North Korea – it is not a failed state, and while it does not have a true democracy there is a strong possibility that it will move toward a freer and more open society in time. Iran was behind the founding of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it has a historical enmity towards the US, but it does not represent an immediate danger which would justify the very belligerent stance taken by the US. There is probably a 5 to 10 year timeframe involved, and the US could choose instead to put its efforts into finding a diplomatic solution which would delay or eliminate the weapons program and save face on both sides.
Instead the US seems to be attempting to use its public statements on Iran to create a narrative which produces a conclusion of the inevitability of a military “solution”. It appears that Russia and China will prevent UN sanctions, and so the stage is set for military action by the US and possibly Israel in the near future.
Preparations
Military preparations, with the possible exception of the development of a better nuclear bunker buster, are completed. Nuclear hawks have been put in charge. UN security council resolution 1540 provides at least the first part of the process of legitimation. This process can only ever be partial, because Russia and China will prevent express authorisation of the use of military action. International law could never allow the use of nuclear weapons in this situation, but of course the US will not allow itself to be sanctioned by that body. What remains, if this is the course of action the US administration chooses, is to minimise public outcry and international condemnation. The official line is a combination of lies and hysteria.
Some experts estimate that Iran will need only three more years to build its first nuclear bomb, and it will pass the point of no return much sooner. Within six to 12 months, Tehran might be able to finish the enrichment facilities that will make the Persian bomb a foregone conclusion. … a terrorist-sponsoring state led by an apocalyptic lunatic will soon have the ability to incinerate Tel Aviv or New York.
George Bush’s recent visit to India and Pakistan, and the agreement with India on nuclear weapons, may indicate that the US has mounted a covert diplomatic offensive designed to minimise the damage a nuclear attack would cause to relations with these countries. Pakistan, at least, would be likely to suffer some fallout from a nuclear strike in the Tehran area by one or more low-yield weapons. It would certainly be politically disastrous for President Musharraf, who is already mistrusted for his close ties to Washington.
Consequences
The whole idea of a nuclear attack seems at first inconceivable, if not for the suffering it would cause then for the destruction of all goodwill remaining toward the US in every part of the world. From the point of view of the nuclear hawks, however, the benefits in US global dominance seem to outweigh these costs.
Such an attack would result in the most significant change in world affairs since 2001, and probably since 1991. It would mark a change from rule by economic power, cultural power, and intellectual power, as it is now, to rule by fear. Just how ineffectual this is, is a lesson the US should have learnt in Iraq, except that its leadership is so blinded by the religion of their own destiny that they are unable to see it. Total military superiority in Iraq, where a significant portion of the population (25%? I don’t know) will not accept US occupation, makes the country ungovernable. Writ large in the world, and it would be, the US would find itself in a position in which it could win any battle but had already and forever lost the war.