Culture, autonomy, and human rights

An attempt at a universalist approach to Human Rights, which if not culturally neutral, at least imposes an explicit moral underpinning rather than an implicit set of cultural values.

Liberals are conflicted people. It’s not a bad thing, it comes about because there’s not always one right answer to a question. Sometimes there are two right answers, sometimes there are only a whole bunch of wrong answers.[1]

This is especially true in regard of what’s called Cultural Relativism. It’s an attractive idea to the liberal mind, because it is compatible with pluralist, multicultural ideals, and steers clear of the patronising imperial notions of (western) cultural superiority. But it’s not an idea that anyone really wants to take to extremes. Should we look on infanticide, female genital mutilation, or ritualised warfare as matters outside our moral compass because they arise in cultures outside our tradition? If so, how do we react when members of that culture live within our own society? The modern cultural relativist takes a compromise view. Practices chosen as particularly barbaric are frowned upon, especially if they involve cultural sexism. Most other practices should be supported as a part of the human right to practise one’s own culture, just as there is a human right to practise one’s own religion.

It sounds tidier than it is. Aboriginals in the more traditional communities in Australia may be empowered by the courts to impose tribal retributions rather than a western judgement being handed down. Prison is notably useless as a means of rehabilitation whereas tribal punishments keep people within, and reinforce the power of, the communities. But on the other hand many traditional cultures are terribly sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic. The relativists would draw the line somewhere short of foot-binding, honour killing, or wife beating, and yet accept the burkah, or no school for girls.

Or not accept those things. This is where it all goes a bit pear shaped. Most liberals pay lip service to cultural relativism, but when they’re pinned down on any particular instance, they’re much more likely to think that, ideally, each individual should have a choice. And individualism doesn’t sit particularly well with cultural relativism, because all cultures, even western culture which has had 300 years trying to find an accommodation with the idea, are concerned with the primacy of the group.

But it isn’t something which can be left half considered: it has implications for human rights, diplomacy, and the moral obligations of individuals and states. The Bangkok Declaration of 1993 portrays “human rights” as a western imposition which is not compatible with “Asian values” of order and and the primacy of society and the family. At the same time UN estimates are of 1.5 to 3 million women and girls who lose their lives every year as a result of gender based violence or neglect.

We have to choose between the primacy of the group and the primacy of the individual, and it’s quite clear that these two are not the same. It is not even in the long term multi-generational interests of individuals to make the interests of the group take precedence, as can be seen in the case of highly patriarchal societies or (other) slave-owning societies. There is no trickle-down effect in extreme cases. So I propose that we start with the rights of the individual and create what rights we can for society from this. A bottom up approach; I don’t think there’s any other sensible way to think about it, given that societies are constructed from individuals, and we measure the outcomes of societies by looking at individuals.

If we are truly starting from the individual, and not imposing ideas drawn from culture at an individual level, then the fundamental human right must be the right to autonomy. By this I mean the right to self-determination: to have maximum control of one’s own life (and ownership of one’s body), but in the expanded sense which incorporates moral responsibility for one’s actions.[2]

There is an unwritten basis for the whole idea of human rights, without which the concept is meaningless, and that is that each human being has equal moral value. This is an ancient idea, and not a product of the western enlightenment, but it’s an idea which has always been in conflict with custom – if only because of a fundamental human proclivity to identify “our tribe” as human and the “others” as worthy of increasingly less moral consideration according to geographical and cultural difference from us. It’s this pernicious distinction which is invoked by genocidaires throughout history, and it surfaces from time to time in the most enlightened cultures.[3]

So if we consider each human being to have equal value, and we cannot (yet) impose cultural values, then we must allow each individual the right to their own determination and their own moral choices. This part of the equation is freedom. People may choose to give some of it up, at any moment – as to engage in what’s called the social contract – but it can never be signed away permanently.[4]

It follows from the idea of equality and the wish to grant the right of autonomy, that each person must exercise sufficient restraint and cooperation in their actions as to avoid excessive infringement on the autonomy of others whilst working together so that each person’s wishes can be achieved. Freedom without consideration for the needs of others is not autonomy, in my mind. Humans are by nature social creatures, so their behaviour if based on pure self interest is somewhere on the spectrum from isolate to predatory. Of course it’s my opinion that to be fully human is to be compassionate and to some extent altruistic, but in practical terms the idea of equal moral value (rather than might makes right) insists on a consideration due to others simply because of a brotherhood of being.

Autonomy is composed, in this theory, in equal parts of freedom and the moral responsibility to safeguard to autonomy of others.[5] There are several consequences of this:

• Physical or mental harm, or the threat of these, reduces the freedom of others and is inconsistent with their right to autonomy.
• Livelihood, safety, and medical aid become human rights for the same reason.
• Education and access to information become human rights, because without these the ability to exercise autonomy is limited.[6]
• The right to the culture of one’s choice. A consequence of the right to autonomy. This can involve the right to give up choice, but one cannot give up the right to retake choice because one cannot give up moral responsibility for choices taken on one’s behalf.[7]
• The responsibility flipside of freedom should be seen as a balance to the difference of capability and resources existing between people. Thus those who are able have an obligation to provide livelihood, safety, and other help for those who are without it due to circumstance, disability, or the actions of others.[8]

There are a few problems with all this which immediately spring to mind: Are there important human rights which are not consequent to the idea of autonomy described in this way? How is someone to assert their right to autonomy in defiance of cultural norms or sanctions? The obligations attendant on autonomy might seem like a licence to interfere in other cultures and other societies. This is mitigated to some extent by requirement that aid be requested – people can choose to submit to a situation which gives up their autonomy, after all. Nevertheless there is an ongoing obligation to interfere in other societies in many more situations than currently contemplated. Finally, is this really a culturally neutral approach? If it imposes norms which are not part of some cultures, then is that imposition justified?

There is probably never going to be agreement about human rights from the cultures which are most subject to interference by such a regime. What may make this proposal even less acceptable is that it implies an obligation of aid from the rich nations to the poor, not just a paternalistic intervention in human rights violations. To proceed I think we need more than motherhood statements based on cultural prejudices – perhaps the idea of autonomy provides a way forward.

Footnotes:

1. Those on the right tend to break down into the people who don’t care what the right answer is, they just want to do what’s best for them, and the people who know they know the right answer, because they’ve spent their lives finding certainties rather than questions. Of course I believe the conservatives have a few more layers than that, but then I’m a liberal. ↩
2. Some of these ideas are from Kant; even if his logic is somewhat circular. What I present is my own sketch of a moral idea, so Herr Kant should not be blamed for the uses I’ve put some of his concepts. I’m avoiding most discussion of free will so as not to broaden the scope of an already long article. ↩
3. For example, in the exemption of suspected Al Quaeda members from normal moral status at Guantanamo, or the way 400000 black tribal people can die in Darfur without most of the world being outraged. ↩
4. Rather as G.W. Bush sees the President’s powers; he can choose not to exercise them, but neither he nor the Congress can pass laws which limit them. Joking aside this is the most problematic part of the whole idea: autonomy is impossible without freedom, but society cannot have people joining and leaving it’s social contract at will. In fact it cannot have people leaving its social contract and remaining within its geographical boundaries, in many cases. ↩
5. Note that the responsibility to ensure the human rights of others, seen as arising from one’s own human rights, makes this system one of both negative (the right to action) and positive (the responsibility to act) parts – which is unusual but I think correct. ↩
6. Without going into the curly question of what sort of education. ↩
7. If I join the army I agree to carry out orders, however I am responsible for the moral consequences of my actions, so if my orders are immoral I must disobey them – retaking my autonomy. ↩
8. Someone who has chosen not to care for themselves has by implication given up the right to aid, at least temporarily (whatever that might seem to mean). ↩