There should be no doubt that Iran’s wish to enrich uranium relates to its desire to create nuclear weapons. The country is ringed by US bases: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Kuwait, as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Pakistan and more importantly Israel have nuclear weapons. Iran has never forgotten the foreign intervention of 1953 and continues to resent US interference in the region. This opinion is shared even by those who for other reasons welcome foreign help against the theocracy. Nuclear weapons are seen as an issue of pride, sovereignty, and security, although President Ahmadinejad’s brinkmanship terrifies many Iranians.
The difficulties involved in developing a bomb should not be underestimated, however. Estimates are that development would require a timescale of about ten years, in spite of the possibility that Iran has received plans from China, and in spite of some inadvertent help with the design by the US. Given that Iran may possess designs for a weapon, and has been training scientists for some years, it follows that obtaining the enriched uranium is, as far as I can tell, the essential next step.
Enriching uranium for peaceful purposes is explicitly allowed under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP). Despite this Iran’s lack of cooperation with inspectors, and the deep suspicions of the United States in particular, have led to international efforts to halt the enrichment program. The IAEA has called for Iran to cease it’s enrichment programme and be more cooperative and open with international oversight. Iran has so far resisted this pressure. Russia and China have helped Iran in the security council by delaying action.
As I write this there is a possibility that Iran will agree to a temporary suspension of its enrichment program, followed by a limited resumption. This would be a way of stepping down the international tension without losing face, and whether the initiative succeeds will say a lot about the degree of determination by Iran to pursue its aim of becoming a nuclear power. It has previously insisted on continuing with its own reprocessing, thereby leaving open its ability to divert the material to weapons uses.
Should Iran continue on its course, Russia and China may not be able to continue to protect it in the security council. Once committed in this way, UN sanctions will perhaps not be a deterrent. The scenario is perhaps this: inspections would presumably be halted, and internally the situation may provide the government an opportunity to crack down on dissent. Oil prices would greatly increase and once possessed of the bomb and a very valuable stock of oil, Iran might feel that it would be able to buy its way back from “rogue nation” status. China in particular has in the past gained advantage by trading with international pariahs, especially for oil.
The US has been making bellicose statements, but they are largely empty. Iran is too large, well defended, and mountainous a target, and the US is stretched too thin, for any chance of a full scale invasion. Israel has declared itself ready to launch a limited strike if all else fails, and the US would have similar capabilities, plus perhaps cruise missiles. This would be designed to set back the Iranian enrichment program rather than to entirely destroy it; the laboratories are decentralised and to some extent underground, and for this reason there could not be the complete success Israel enjoyed in the attack on the reactor at Osirak.
Perhaps in this way the Iranian weapons program could be delayed by a couple of years. This would come at the cost of completely alienating a key Muslim state with large oil reserves, and one which would now be absolutely determined to become a nuclear state. The US strategy towards Iran has until now been to surround, intimidate, and wait. It is clearly in the interest of the US to put as much pressure on Iran as possible, both unilaterally and in cooperation with the international community, to delay or abandon its nuclear ambitions. Like Iran itself, it has something to gain both internationally and domestically from a degree of brinkmanship. Also like Iran it has a lot to lose from taking this game of chicken past the point of no return. It may be in vain given the leaders involved, but we must all hope that both sides apply the brakes before they reach the edge.